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Abstract. Geosocial networks such as Foursquare have access to users’ location information, friend-
ships, and other potentially privacy sensitive information. In this paper, we show that an attacker
with access to a naively-anonymized geosocial network dataset can breach users’ privacy by consid-
ering location patterns of the target users. We study the problem of anonymizing such a dataset in
order to avoid re-identiﬁcation of a user based on her or her friends’ location information. We intro-
duce k-anonymity-based properties for geosocial network datasets, propose appropriate data models
and algorithms, and evaluate our approach on both synthetic and real-world datasets.
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1 Introduction
Advances in positioning technologies and the proliferation of location-enabled mobile de-
vices has recently given rise to Geosocial Networks (GSNs). These systems, which are also
referred to as Location-Based Social Networks (LBSNs), are a type of social networking
systems that primarily focus on the locations of users and the applications related to them.
Users provide their location information to these systems, often using location-enabled mo-
bile devices, and interactions between users and these systems and among users take place
based on the location information they have provided. Foursquare, Facebook Places, and
Yelp are examples of LBSNs.
Studyofsocialnetworksisofsigniﬁcantinterestofbothacademiaandindustrycommuni-
ties. And online social networking systems have made it possible to collect a huge volume
of social network data. However, publishing such datasets has its complications regarding
users’ privacy. Recent research literature on publishing social network datasets has shown
effective ways to re-identify nodes of naively anonymized social networks, where only
user identiﬁers are removed. The attacks on naively anonymized datasets range from us-
ing nodes’ degree in a network as identifying signature [9, 8], to actively implanting nodes
in a network [1], to using other publicly available social networks for de-anonymization
purposes [12]. A GSN dataset can be more vulnerable to privacy attacks as an adversary
can also leverage users’ location information for re-identiﬁcation purposes. Use of location
information in re-identiﬁcation has been well investigated in the context of location-based
services, and various privacy preserving protocols and anonymization techniques have
been proposed as possible solutions [11, 7, 2, 5].
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In this paper, we propose an anonymization approach for GSN datasets, that considers
both location and social connections. In particular, we consider datasets collected by sys-
tems such as Foursquare where users can befriend other users in the system, and check
into location venues. Such a GSN dataset is essentially a social network of users, i.e., users
and their relations with each other, and a series of logged locations for each of the users
in the network. The log may contain speciﬁc location information and the times at which
a user has reported those locations. Various privacy attacks can be launched against a
naively anonymized GSN dataset. We focus on the re-identiﬁcation attack based on adver-
sary’s background knowledge about user locations. In a recent large-scale study of location
data collected from cellphone users [16], Zang and Bolot report that a signiﬁcant percent-
age of cellphone users are uniquely identiﬁable based on their top two or three locations.
Moreover, Noulas et al. [13] report that home and corporate/ofﬁce places are the top two
locations from which people perform check-ins in Foursquare. Motivated by these studies,
we argue that check-in locations in a GSN dataset can be used by attackers to re-identify a
target user. Moreover, the location information of the target’s connections may strengthen
the possibility of re-identiﬁcation. For instance, an attacker may know that the target fre-
quently visits a certain coffee shop, and also knows about his/her workplace. In addi-
tion, the attacker may know the home address of a colleague of the target at work. Such
background knowledge may easily enable re-identiﬁcation of the target. We formulate the
above problem and propose k-anonymization techniques to thwart such attacks.
In this work, unlike in the existing literature on social network anonymization, we do not
consider friendship structure of a target node as a feasible background knowledge for ad-
versaries. That is mainly because our observations on GSNs such as Foursquare show that
users on average have much smaller number of friends in these systems than in general
purpose social networking systems such as Facebook. Therefore, their social connections
hardly represent their real friendship network. Instead, we focus on the location infor-
mation revealed by social connections of a user that can assist in re-identiﬁcation. Our
contributions in this work can be summarized as follows:
 We formulate a simple and abstract model of GSNs, based on which we introduce
two notions of anonymity for GSN datasets, i.e., Lk-anonymity and L2
k-anonymity.
 We present a family of two location models for GSNs, called top regions and top venues,
that we use as the underlying data models for our algorithms.
 We propose clustering algorithms for anonymizing a GSN dataset according to the
notions of Lk-anonymity and L2
k-anonymity, including a new approach to split over-
size clusters.
 We present experimental results on a dataset collected from a real-world GSN, as well
as a synthetic dataset generated based on previous studies.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to study anonymization of GSN
datasets. However, as mentioned earlier, related work has studied anonymization in the
context of location-based services and social networks, separately. The rest of the paper is
structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notions of location equivalence and
corresponding anonymity properties for GSN datasets. Section 3 presents appropriate lo-
cation models for GSNs. In Section 4, we propose algorithms to anonymize a GSN dataset
based on our proposed anonymity properties. We report results obtained by running the
algorithms on real-world and synthetic datasets in Section 5. We brieﬂy survey the related
work in Section 6, and ﬁnally, conclude the paper in Section 7.
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Figure 1: A small sample GSN
2 k-Anonymity for GSN Datasets
Location information contained about the users in GSN dataset may help an attacker to
re-identify users. Such re-identiﬁcation can lead to further privacy breaches such as disclo-
sure of a user’s complete location information and other privacy-sensitive attributes. We
introduce two anonymity properties based on the concept of k-anonymity to prevent such
a linking attack based on users’ location information. While the ﬁrst property protects in-
ference based on the target user’s location, the second property also considers location of
her friends.
For our proposed framework, we deﬁne a GSN dataset as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A GSN dataset is a 4-tuple G = hV;E;L;Li, where V is a set of users, E 
V V is a set of friendship links between users, L is a domain for location information, and
L : V ! L is a function that assigns location information to users.
In the above deﬁnition, the location domain abstractly refers to the type of location infor-
mation that can be used for a linking attack. The location values can be as simple as street
addresses, or as complex as a spatio-temporal patterns of user movements. In this paper,
we focus on a speciﬁc location model, top locations, which will be detailed in Section 3.
Figure 1 illustrates a small GSN dataset based on the above deﬁnition. Users and the con-
nections between them form a social network. Each user is also assigned a location value
in the location domain.
Since we are interested in anonymity based on location information, we introduce the
following notion of location equivalence for GSN users.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a GSN hV;E;L;Li, we say that users u and v 2 V are L-equivalent
(u L v) if they are assigned the same location information, i.e., L(u) = L(v).
In Figure 1, users u, v, and w are L-equivalent since all are assigned to location value l3.
Similarly, users a and x are L-equivalent. Intuitively, anonymity can be provided by en-
suring enough L-equivalent users for every user in a GSN dataset. The following property
captures the notion of k-anonymity based on L-equivalence.
Deﬁnition 3. A GSN hV;E;L;Li is Lk-anonymous iff for every user v 2 V , there are at least
k   1 other users that are L-equivalent to v. Formally, 8v 2 V 9v1;v2;:::;vk 1 2 V;v L
v1 L v2 ::: L vk 1.
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Based on the above property, an attacker cannot re-identify a user with a certainty greater
than 1=k even if he obtains the target’s location information.
Lk-anonymity considers only a target’s location information as adversary’s background
knowledge and no further information about social relationships of a target. However, for
a GSN dataset, an attacker may leverage knowledge about location information of a tar-
get’s friends to perform more successful re-identiﬁcation attacks. For instance, suppose an
attacker knows that the target is working at the IS department in the University of Pitts-
burgh. Also, the attacker knows that she has a friend that works in the CS department
and another friend that frequently visits a speciﬁc coffee shop. Although, Lk-anonymity
helps keep the user anonymous based on her location, her friends’ location information can
further help the attacker to reduce the anonymity set. The following location equivalence
relation takes into account a user’s friends’ location information.
Deﬁnition 4. Given a GSN hV;E;L;Li, we say that users u and v 2 V are L2-equivalent
(u L2 v) iff, in addition to themselves, their adjacent users in the social network are also
L-equivalent, i.e., (L(u) = L(v)) ^ (fL(u0)jhu;u0i 2 Eg = fL(v0)jhv;v0i 2 Eg).
In Figure 1, users u and v are L2-equivalent; because they are L-equivalent, and the set
of u’s friends’ location information, i.e., fl1;l2;l4g, is equal to those of v’s. We deﬁne the
k-anonymity property based on L2-equivalence as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. A GSN hV;E;L;Li is L2
k-anonymous iff for every user v 2 V , there are at least
k   1 other users that are L2-equivalent to v. Formally, 8v 2 V 9v1;v2;:::;vk 1 2 V;v L2
v1 L2 v2 ::: L2 vk 1.
L2
k-anonymity is obviously a stronger property than Lk-anonymity, and consequently
costlier to guarantee. Note that in Deﬁnition 4, the neighbors’ locations are not required
to map one-to-one to each other’s. Only the collection of neighbors’ locations needs to be
the same. The latter is a more relaxed constraint than the former. We believe that it is more
realistic to assume that the attacker may know about the location of a number of a target’s
friends rather than the exact locations of all her friends.
3 Top Locations Models
The anonymity properties deﬁned in Section 2 are abstract with regards to the location
model, i.e., no speciﬁc model is assumed. In this section, we introduce location models that
describe top locations which are somehow revealing about a user, assisting an attacker to
re-identify her. Top locations may be based on the frequency of a user’s visit (e.g., work-
place, a coffee shop on the way or close to work, etc.), or could be the ones that are more
uniquely identiﬁed with the user (e.g., home location). Such models give us a realistic
and reasonably powerful representation of an adversary’s background knowledge about
a target’s location information in GSNs, and is also supported by previous studies in the
literature. According to the data reported about cell sector location of cellular phone users
[16], more than 80% of them are uniquely identiﬁable based on their top (most frequent)
three locations. Based on the top two locations, about 45% are uniquely identiﬁable, and
more than 85% have at most one other user with the same top location. Note that a cellu-
lar sector is of coarser granularity than speciﬁc venues that people report in GSNs such as
Foursquare. Speciﬁc to GSNs, based on the data reported in [13], home and ofﬁce locations
are the two top venues people report on average in Foursquare, which seems good enough
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for their re-identiﬁcation. An advantage of considering a top locations model is that it is
not very complex for performing k-anonymziation.
We consider two variations of top location models, Top Regions and Top Venues, each of
which are suitable for different purposes and expected outcomes of anonymization. The
Top Regions model considers a pure geospatial model of locations, while the Top Venues
model considers named places with geospatial properties. For the Top Regions model,
anonymizations can be achieved by reporting spatially cloaked regions instead of speciﬁc
geographic coordinates. However, for the Top Venues model, we consider reporting a set
of nearby venues instead of one speciﬁc venue. This is due to the prime importance of
the concept of venue in such a dataset, and the fact that they are considered to be publicly
known.
3.1 Top Regions Model TRm
This model is useful for GSN datasets that contain self-reported geolocations of users,
which might be at different levels of granularity. For simplicity, we assume that a loca-
tion can ﬁt in a rectangular region.
Deﬁnition 6. TheTRm location domain containsvalues as m-tuples such ashr1;r2;:::;rmi,
where every ri is a rectangular region.
In the above deﬁnition, a rectangular region is a geographic area surrounded by a rect-
angle. Rectangular region r is represented using a 4-tuple hx;y;w;hi, where x and y are
geographic coordinates of the top-left corner, and w and h are width and height of the area,
respectively. Zero width and height determine an exact point as a region. We use dot no-
tation to represent members of a tuple, e.g., l:r1 represents region r1 belonging to location
l.
We consider spatial cloaking to anonymize a set of regions, and replace them with more
coarse grain regions. For this purpose, k users that have close enough m top regions can be
considered as one L-equivalency class, and the same cloaked m top regions can be reported
for all.
3.2 Top Venues Model TVm
This model is suitable for GSN datasets taken from systems with pre-speciﬁed venues, e.g.,
check-in-based GSNs such as Foursquare.
Deﬁnition7. TheTVm locationdomaincontainsvaluesasm-tuplessuchashv1;v2;:::;vmi,
where every vi is a venue with deﬁned geographic coordinates.
We do not consider reporting a spatial cloaked region as a good option for anonymizing
this type of GSN datasets. Location-equivalency classes should still be formed around
users with geographically close top venues. However, as the anonymized location values,
the sets of venues belonging to the class members and corresponding to each of a user’s
venues will be reported.
4 Top Locations Anonymization Algorithms
The ﬁrst step in anonymizing a dataset using our model is to select representative top
locations for each user as her location information. In this section, we review two intuitive
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options for such a selection. We propose to use clustering to anonymize GSN datasets
based on the top locations model. The goal is to form users into clusters of size at least
k; then report the same location information for all the users in the same cluster. Our
optimization goal is to minimize distortion of the location information in the anonymized
dataset. However, the Top Regions and Top Venues models demand different strategies to
achieve this goal. Therefore, we propose different notions of distance for each model. We
propose generic clustering approaches that can work with either of the location models and
corresponding distance measures.
4.1 Top Locations Selection
Both the studies on location patterns anonymity in GSNs [16, 13], that we referred to in
Section 3, provide evidence on importance of places of frequent visit in identifying users.
Therefore, our ﬁrst heuristic for selecting top locations is to select the m most frequently
reported locations for each user as her top locations information. Let c(v;l) be the number
of reports of user v in location l. A location li belongs to a user’s m most frequent locations
Lmf = fl1;:::;lmg if and only if
8li 2 Lmf 6 9l0 62 Lmf;c(v;l0) > c(v;li):
We also mentioned brieﬂy about the possibility of re-identiﬁcation based on locations that
are most unique to a user and not necessarily the most frequent. Intuitively, an attacker can
ﬁlter out users better using such a background knowledge about its target. We employ the
concept of term frequency - inverse document frequency in the information retrieval literature
for selecting the most unique features to each user. A location li belongs to a user’s m most
unique locations Lmu = fl1;:::;lmg if and only if
8li 2 Lmu 6 9l0 62 Lmu;
c(v;l0)
P
u2V c(u;l0)
>
c(v;li)
P
u2V c(u;li)
:
Note that the type of the top locations information model (TRm & TVm) is independent of
how those top locations are selected as described in this section.
4.2 Distance Measures for Top Locations Models
Central to our clustering algorithm is a distance measure that can determine which users
should be clustered together. While anonymization involves introducing uncertainty to the
dataset to achieve the desired privacy property, we need to do so by minimizing introduced
inaccuracies. A suitable distance metric can ensure that the anonymized location values
have minimum possible inaccuracy compared to the original values.
Inthetopregionsmodel, regionsshouldbereplacedwiththeircloakedversions. Cloaking
multiple location points is usually performed by ﬁnding a minimum bounding rectangle
thatincludesallthelocations[11,5]. ThecloakingprocessinTRm ismorecomplicatedsince
each user’s location consists of m regions. For example, consider users u and v’s TR2 loca-
tions depicted in Figure 2. Each user has r1 and r2 regions as a point. Combining the two
location values results in a third location value with two regions. However, there are alter-
native ways for performing this. Each of the u’s regions can be considered corresponding
to any of v’s regions for the cloaking purpose. This results in two different region correspon-
dences: fhL(u):r1;L(v):r2i; hL(u):r2;L(v):r1ig and fhL(u):r1;L(v):r1i; hL(u):r2;L(v):r2ig.
As shown in Figure 2, the former correspondence results in smaller cloaked areas for the
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u.r1
u.r2
v.r1
v.r2
u’s top locations
v’s top locations
cloaking for 
correspondence 1
cloaking for 
correspondence 2
Figure 2: Example of Cloaking in the TRm Model
results than the latter. Therefore, it is a better option in terms of preserving location accu-
racy. The correspondence that results in the smallest cloaking among the alternatives can
be used as a natural distance measure for our clustering approach. Location information of
two nodes can be combined to form larger cluster of nodes that meet the anonymity prop-
erty, while minimum cloaking is applied to preserve the location information as much as
possible.
We now deﬁne the distance measure for the top regions model. When two TRm values
are to be combined into one cluster, corresponding regions should be combined (cloaked)
into one region. Since there are m different regions in each TRm location tuple, there will
be m! different combinations for region correspondences. As mentioned earlier, we con-
sider the minimum expansion in area that results from cloaking based on any of such
correspondences as the distance measure between two TRm values. The following def-
inition formally captures the notion of distance in TRm. Operator 
 in the following
deﬁnition is an element-by-element binary operator for equally sized tuples, which out-
puts the set of 2-tuples from the elements of ﬁrst and second operands. For instance,
hA;B;Ci
h1;2;3i = fhA;1i;hB;2i;hC;3ig. Also, function Perm calculates the set of all per-
mutation tuples for a given set. For instance, Perm(f1;2;3g) = fh1;2;3i; h1;3;2i; h2;1;3i;
h2;3;1i; h3;1;2i; h3;2;1ig.
Deﬁnition 8. Given TRm values t and s, we deﬁne the distance between them, DTRm, as
follows:
DTRm(t;s) = min
C2Perm(h1;:::;mi)
X
hi;ji2h1;:::;mi
C
MBRA(t:ri;s:rj)
where MBRA calculates the area of minimum bounding rectangle area of two regions.
In the above deﬁnition, a correspondence is formed based on each permutation of num-
bers 1;:::;m, and the sums of the minimum bounding rectangle areas of the corresponding
regions are calculated. The minimum value among the calculated values for all correspon-
dences is selected as the distance between the two locations. In the example depicted in
Figure 2, MBRA calculates the area of each dashed rectangle. It is easy to see that the sum
of areas of the bounding rectangles associated with correspondence 1 is smaller than that
for correspondence 2. Therefore, the sum of the areas of the line-dashed rectangles is re-
garded as the distance between the locations of u and v.
The distance measure for the top venues model has a simpler formulation. Each user’s lo-
cation in the TVm model includes m venues. Combining two such location values involves
ﬁnding the appropriate correspondence between venues and reporting the set of corre-
sponding venues in place of each of the original venues. Therefore, the goal is to minimize
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the distance between venues in each set. In the following deﬁnition, we use the concepts
of operator 
 and function Perm as deﬁned above.
Deﬁnition 9. Given TVm values t and s, we deﬁne the distance between them, DTVm, as
follows:
DTVm(t;s) = min
C2Perm(h1;:::;mi)
X
hi;ji2h1;:::;mi
C
ED(t:vi;s:vj)
where ED calculates the euclidean distance between geographic coordinates of two venues.
4.3 GSN Lk-Anonymization
Using the distance measures deﬁned in Section 4.2, we use a clustering approach similar
to the Union-Split method [14], to create clusters with minimum k nodes, and produce an
anonymized value for each cluster. However, we modify the algorithm to accommodate
our data models, which are signiﬁcantly different than the original numerical values it was
proposed for. The input to our algorithm is a GSN dataset based on a top location model,
for which location information is selected based on one of the criteria in Section 4.1. Note
that according to our top location models, every user needs to be represented by m top
locations. Therefore, any user with less than m unique locations should be either retracted
from the dataset, or assigned to enough dummy location values to fulﬁll the constraint.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for Lk-anonymization. The algorithm is a special
hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm that terminates when each cluster has at
least k members. The same algorithm works for both top locations models by adjusting the
distance and center computation corresponding to each model.
The algorithm starts with each user as a separate cluster, with the cluster center set as her
location. In each iteration, the distance between every pair of clusters is computed. The
pair of clusters with the minimum distance are selected to be merged. The cluster center
of the merger is calculated according to the top locations model in use. As in Deﬁnitions 8
and 9, distance is calculated based on a correspondence with minimum value. In order to
calculate cluster centers, it is important to know which top locations of each user in a clus-
ter correspond to those of others. Therefore, we keep track of such correspondences and
update them whenever users are assigned to new clusters. In order to calculate a cluster
center, corresponding components of them members are combined. As a simple exam-
ple, let have cluster c1 = fv1;v2;v3g, and user-to-cluster correspondences P1 = f1;3;2g,
P2 = f2;3;1g, and P3 = f3;1;2g. The cluster center’s ﬁrst top location is formed by com-
bining v1:r1, v2:r2, and v3:r3. Its second top location is formed by combining v1:r3, v2:r3,
and v3:r1. Finally, its third top location is formed by combining v1:r2, v2:r1, and v3:r3. The
actual method to combine these components is dependent on the top locations model in
use. In case of TRm, locations are combined by calculating the minimum bounding rectan-
gle of the corresponding locations. In case of TVm, locations are combined by calculating
the middle point of the corresponding locations. If the merger has more than two times
the desired size of anonymity clusters, i.e., more than 2k, the cluster needs to be broken
into two (preferably equally-sized) clusters. We perform this to avoid ending up having
clusters signiﬁcantly larger than the required anonymity size (Step 11 in Algorithm 1). The
larger the size of an anonymity set, the more location distortion. Instead of special k-means
clustering proposed in [14] we take a much simpler approach to split an oversized cluster,
which is outlined in Algorithm 2. In the last part of the algorithm (steps 15–23), location
information of each user is anonymized according to its cluster. In case of TRm, a cluster
center represents cloaked top locations that can represent all its members. In case of TVm,
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Algorithm 1 Lk-Anonymize
Input: GSN dataset G = hV;E;L;Li and the anonymization parameter k.
Output: Lk-anonymous dataset G0 = hV;E;L;L0i.
1: Initialize clusters C as fcjjvj 2 V;cj   fvjg;cj:center   L(vj)g
2: Initialize user-to-cluster correspondences P for each vi as Pi   h1;:::;mi
3: while 9c 2 C;jcj < k do
4: for all ci;cj 2 C do
5: Calculate distance DL(ci:center;cj:center) . using Deﬁnition 8 or 9
6: end for
7: Merge cx and cy into cm, where DL(cx:center;cy:center) is minimum
8: Update P for cm members according to the correspondence that resulted in the min-
imum distance above
9: Calculate cm:center according to cm members’ correspondences
10: if jcmj  2k then
11: Split cm and replace it by cm1 and cm2 (s.t. jcm1j  k and jcm2j  k) using
Algorithm 2
12: end if
13: end while
14: G0   G
15: for all c 2 C do
16: for all u 2 c do
17: if L = TRm then
18: L0(u)   c:center
19: else if L = TVm then
20: L0(u)   hfui:vPi[1]j8ui 2 cg;:::;fui:vPi[m]j8ui 2 cgi
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: return G0
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each of a user’s m top locations is replaced by a set that contains the corresponding top
locations of all other members within the same cluster.
The Split-Cluster algorithm (Algorithm 2) divides one oversized cluster into two clusters
with minimum size k. It starts by assigning two randomly chosen users as cluster centers.
In each iteration, every user is assigned to its nearest cluster. Then if one of the clusters
is undersized, it takes enough close users from the other cluster to reach size k. Finally,
the center is recalculated for each cluster. The algorithm iterates until either both clusters
have minimum size k in their initial member assignment or the loop reaches one of its
stopping criteria. The ﬁrst stopping criterion assesses whether further iterations improves
the clusters or not. For this purpose, we calculate an error that measures changes in user-
to-cluster distances due to changing in cluster assignment in Step 24. If we cannot fairly
improve such an error compared to the last iteration (measured by small constant ), we
consider the formed clusters ﬁnal and return them. The second criterion simply puts a limit
on the number of iterations using constant MI.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 outputs an Lk-anonymous dataset as per Deﬁnition 3.
Proof. All the users are members of clusters since the algorithm starts with every user as
a single cluster and merges them iteratively. Also, the main loop in the algorithm (steps
3–13) does not terminate until all the clusters have at least k members, i.e., 8c 2 C;jcj  k.
Therefore, assigning the same location information to all the members of the same cluster
in steps 15–23 ensures that for every user v in a cluster c there are at least k   1 other users
v1;v2;:::;vk 1 2 c where v L v1 L v2 ::: L vk 1.
The time complexity of an optimized implementation of Algorithm 1 is O(m!n2 logn),
where m is the parameter of the TRm or TVm model, and n is the number of users. Note
that in practice, the O(m!) will not be signiﬁcant for small values of m and can be disre-
garded as we will explain later. With the assumption of rare need for split, the main loop of
the algorithm (steps 3–13) iterates n times to merge the clusters, given that in each iteration
two clusters are merged into one. An optimized implementation of distance calculation
(steps 4–6) can be achieved by maintaining a sorted list of distances for each cluster, and
updating only the entries related to the merger cluster at each iteration. Calculating the
initial distances takes O(m!n2) (which should be performed before the main loop), and up-
dating them takes O(m!nlogn) in each iteration. In these complexity orders, the O(m!)
factor is due to each distance calculation according to Deﬁnition 8 or 9. However, we do
not expect value m to be large (much more than 3) as a reasonable background knowledge
for an attacker. Although, it would not break our algorithm, a large m value will result in a
highly uncertain dataset which might not be useful any more. Such intuition is also based
on our observations in the studies reported in the literature [16, 13]. Hence, the O(m!)
factor in our complexity will not be signiﬁcant in practice. Split-Cluster (Algorithm 2) has
also time complexity O(m!nlogn). In each iteration of the main loop of Algorithm 2, we
need to calculate the distances of the two cluster centers to each user and store them sorted.
Given that the number of iterations is limited to a constant, the complexity is bounded by
O(m!nlogn). We want to note that in our experiments, Algorithm 2 quickly converges and
terminates due to the error thresholding approach in less than 5 iterations, even for large
inputs. TheﬁnalloopinAlgorithm1hascomplexityO(n). Therefore, consideringthenum-
ber of iterations of the main loop, and the complexity of its distance calculations and the
splitting approach as described above, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(m!n2 logn).
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Algorithm 2 Split-Cluster
Input: A set of users V 0, their corresponding location function L, and minimum cluster
size k.
Output: Two clusters c1 and c2 that together include users V 0 and each one has at least k
members, as well as the user-to-cluster correspondences P0 for those users.
1: Initialize user-to-cluster correspondences P0 for each vi 2 V 0 as P0
i   h1;:::;mi
2: c1:center   L(v1 2 V 0)
3: c2:center   L(v2 2 V 0) . v1 and v2 are selected at random.
4: error   +1
5: iteration   1
6: repeat
7: for all vj 2 V 0 do
8: Calculate distances DL(c1:center;vj) and DL(c2:center;vj) according to the cor-
responding measure to location model L (Deﬁnition 8 or 9)
9: Assign vj to the cluster with smaller distance
10: Update P0
j according to the correspondence that resulted in the smaller distance
above
11: end for
12: if jc1j < k then
13: x   1 . x is index for undersized cluster.
14: y   2 . y is index for oversized cluster.
15: t   k   jc1j . t is the number of users to be added to cx.
16: else if jc2j < k then
17: x   2
18: y   1
19: t   k   jc2j
20: else
21: break
22: end if
23: Let T be set of of ﬁrst t users in cy sorted in ascending order of their distance to cx
24: Assign T to cx
25: Update P0 for users in T according to the correspondences that results in the small-
est distance to cx
26: Calculate cx:center and cy:center based on P0
27: last-error   error
28: error  
1
t
X
vj2T
(DL (cx:center;vj)   DL (cy:center;vj))
29: until (jlast-error   errorj < ) or (iteration > MI)
30: return c1, c2, and P0
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4.4 GSN L2
k-Anonymization
We build on our proposed algorithm in Section 4.3 to make a GSN dataset L2
k-anonymous
based on Deﬁnition 5. In fact, we rely on the clustering and cloaking performed by the
Lk-anonymization algorithm. Algorithm 1 clusters users and makes them Lk-equivalent
in each cluster. For L2
k-anonymization, we further modify edges in the social network to
ensuretheLk-equivalenceofneighborsofusersineachcluster. Weconsidertwoalternative
approaches for performing this. In the ﬁrst approach, the edges in the original network are
preserved and only new edges are inserted. Therefore, no edge information in the social
network is lost during anonymization. In the second approach, edges are both inserted and
removed to assure the anonymity property. The rationale behind this approach is to avoid
too much increase in the size of the social network due to anonymization.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code for L2
k-anonymization. We ﬁrst perform the steps in
Algorithm 1 to achieve the resultant clusters and the Lk-anonymous dataset. Next, for any
two clusters ci and cj, we form set Eij of inter-cluster edges between the clusters (edges
connecting a member from one to a member from the other). If the number of the inter-
cluster edges is less than a threshold , the algorithm removes those edges from the graph.
Otherwise, the algorithm ensures that all the users in one cluster have at least a neighbor
in the other cluster, by adding missing edges. If a user needs to have a neighbor from
another cluster, one of the members of that cluster is randomly chosen and an edge is
created between them. Note that ci and cj can refer to the same cluster in the special case.
In that case, the edges Eij are called intra-cluster rather than inter-cluster. However, the
same procedure is applicable to guarantee Lk-equivalent neighbors for the users.
The inter-cluster edge count threshold  is signiﬁcant in controlling the behavior of Al-
gorithm 3. If we want to choose the approach of preserving all edges in the original social
network  should be set to zero. This ensures that Step 6 of the algorithm is never executed.
Therefore, only edges will be inserted. In contrast, if we set  to any non-zero value, it tends
to keep the inter-cluster edges that seem to be important according to the threshold, and
remove the other less essentials. For a non-zero threshold, we suggest setting  to half the
size of the smaller cluster between ci and cj. The rationale is to keep the change in the net-
work minimal. If half of the members are already involved in inter-cluster relationships, it
may be better to keep them and add the rest that satisfy our anonymization criteria rather
than to remove them. Otherwise, removal of those sparse connections will introduce less
changes in the social network.
In the following, we prove correctness of the proposed algorithm for L2
k-anonymization.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 outputs an L2
k-anonymous dataset as per Deﬁnition 5.
Proof. The ﬁrst step of the algorithm generates an Lk-anonymous dataset, and correspond-
ing clusters with L-equivalent members, according to Theorem 1. We need to show that
every member of a cluster is also L2-equivalent to other members of the same cluster. Con-
sider an arbitrary cluster c and one of its members v 2 c. For any other cluster member
u 6= v 2 c, u L v according to Theorem 1. For each edge adjacent to v, say hv;v0i 2 E0,
there exists at least an adjacent edge to u, say hu;u0i 2 E0, where v0 and u0 are in the same
cluster. This is assured by inserting the edges in the social network in steps 10 and 15.
Therefore, set fL(u0)jhu;u0i 2 E0g will be equal to set fL(v0)jhv;v0i 2 E0g, which completes
the proof for u L2 v.
The main part of Algorithm 3 (steps 3–19) has time complexity O(n2). Considering the
minimum cluster size k, there will be at most bn=kc clusters in C. Therefore the main loop
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Algorithm 3 L2
kAnonymize
Input: GSN dataset G = hV;E;L;Li and the anonymization parameter k.
Output: L2
k-anonymous dataset G0 = hV;E0;L;L0i.
1: E0   E
2: LkAnonymize(G)
3: for all ci;cj 2 C do
4: Eij   fhu;vi 2 Ej9u 2 ci;v 2 cjg
5: if jEijj <  then
6: E0   E0 n Eij
7: else
8: for all u 2 ci do
9: if 6 9v 2 cj;hu;vi 2 E then
10: E0   E0 [ fhu;vig, where v 2 cj is randomly chosen
11: end if
12: end for
13: for all v 2 cj do
14: if 6 9u 2 ci;hu;vi 2 E then
15: E0   E0 [ fhu;vig, where u 2 ci is randomly chosen
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: end for
20: return G0
runs O(n2=k2) times. Each cluster has less than 2k nodes, due to the splitting mechanism.
So enumerating members of every pair of clusters for edge insertion purpose has complex-
ity O(k2). Therefore, the overall complexity of the main part is O(n2=k2)  O(k2) = O(n2).
Given that Algorithm 1 has higher time complexity than this, the time complexity of Algo-
rithm 3 is bounded by Algorithm 1’s complexity, i.e., O(m!n2 logn).
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Datasets
We conduct our experiments on a real-world and a synthetic dataset. The former is a partial
dataset collected from a check-in-based GSN, Gowalla. Gowalla was a service similar to
FoursquarewhichhasbeenacquiredbyFacebookrecently. Theoriginaldataset[4]contains
friendship links and public check-in data between Feb. 2009 and Oct. 2010. We extract a
partial network, constituting a community of 1016 users and 2757 edges, detected by a
label propagation scheme. This dataset is used for experimenting with the TVm model
and will be referred to as GW from here on. We extract a TV3 GSN from GW dataset based
on most frequent venues, in order to evaluate anonymization using the TVm model. We
note that the method of top location selection as described in Section 4.1, i.e., selecting the
most frequent or most unique locations, does not affect the performance evaluation of our
anonymization algorithms. Because the resulting top location dataset of using each method
can be considered as an independent dataset. Therefore, without loss of generality, we only
present our experimental results on the most frequent venues.
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Figure 3: Size of the anonymity sets in dataset ST when top 1, 2, or 3 locations are revealed
We generated the second dataset synthetically. In the generation process, we used the
statistics reported in [16] on a nation-wide cellular network in order to have realistic distri-
butions regarding identiﬁability of users with regards to their locations. We experiment on
this dataset as a TR3 model. More speciﬁcally, we leveraged the distribution of anonymity
group sizes with regards to considering one, two, and three top locations per cellular sector.
However, we scaled down the dataset size to 1500 users (the data reported in [16] is about
25 million users). Figure 3 shows the size of anonymity sets for different percentile of users
in our dataset, depending on the condition of revealing one, two, or three top locations.
In our synthetic dataset, each of the three user’s regions is a point, randomly chosen on a
1000 by 1000 unit square-shaped area. These points are converted to cloaked regions as the
result of the anonymization algorithm. We refer to this dataset as ST from here on.
5.2 Lk-Anonymization
We ran the Lk-anonymization algorithm using different k values, in the range of 5 to 100,
on the TV3 model of GW dataset. To evaluate our location anonymization performance in
the context of the TV3 model, we measure an error value that determines the spread of
venues in each cluster. We ﬁrst compute a center of the cluster corresponding to each of the
three venues in each user’s location. We calculate the error as the mean distance of users
to the cluster center averaged across the three venue dimensions. We also normalize the
error by the spread of all location values in the dataset. Note that a more accurate baseline
for normalization of error values for our location model would need to consider grouping
locations in m different dimensions, which would intuitively be a larger error value than
our current baseline. All distances are measured on the geocoordinates of the venues based
on Haversine formula. Lower location spread error ensures that the corresponding venues
used for Lk-anonymity are also physically close to each other. The box plots in Figure 4
show the location spread error calculated for clusters corresponding to the runs on differ-
ent values of k. As suggested by the boxes in Figure 4a the Lk-Anonymize algorithm has
relatively low location spread error. However, there exist outliers that may signiﬁcantly
increase the average error. Our algorithm does not consider suppression of outlier values
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Figure 4: Location Preservation Performance in Lk-Anonymization of TV3-Based GW
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Figure 5: Clustering Performance in Lk-Anonymization of TV3-Based GW
in the dataset, in order to avoid removing possibly important information. A careful sup-
pression approach can certainly improve the results. In the log scale plot of Figure 4b, it is
more visible how location spread error lightly increases with the increase of k.
Figure 5 reports the distribution of cluster sizes for different values of k. The distribu-
tions verify that the algorithm produces clusters with minimum size k as required by the
anonymity property. Because of the nature of clustering approach, we end up with clusters
that are sightly larger than the minimum k value.
WeranAlgorithm1on theTR3 modelofSTdataset, withvalues ofk between3and50. We
calculate the average area of the regions in users’ location information after anonymization,
as a measure of performance of our algorithm in preserving location information. Figure
6 depicts this measure as a result of choosing different k values. As expected, the area has
an increasing trend with the increase of k. However, we notice that the region areas do not
change signiﬁcantly after k = 15 in our dataset. We also consider the insigniﬁcant decrease
in area size due to the greedy nature of our clustering approach, which does not guarantee
to produce optimum results.
5.3 L2
k-Anonymization
Since our L2
k-anonymization algorithm is based on clusters created by the Lk-anonymiza-
tion algorithm, the analysis of location preservation performance in Section 5.2 directly
applies to it as well. In order to evaluate the preservation/distortion of social network
structure by the algorithm, we consider two simple measures. The edge count ratio calcu-
lates the proportion of edges in the resulting network to that of the original. The edge overlap
ratio calculates the fraction of edges that have been preserved from the original network in
the resulting network. These measures apply to both datasets as the choice of location
model is not relevant. Figure 7 depicts these measures for the L2
k-anonymization result of
GW dataset, based on different values of k. The measure is plotted for both suggested values
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Figure 6: Location Preservation Performance in Lk-anonymization of TR3-based ST
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Figure 7: Network Preservation Performance in L2
k-Anonymization of TV3-Based GW
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Figure 8: Network Preservation Performance in L2
k-Anonymization of TR3-Based ST
for threshold . We ran Algorithm 3, i.e., zero and half of the size of the smaller cluster in a
pair. A choice of  = 0 ensures preservation of the original edges, but also adds much more
edges to the graph compared to the case of non-zero .
Figure 8 shows the edge count and overlap ratios for L2
k-anonymization of the TR3-Based
ST dataset. Interestingly, both approaches of  threshold seem to perform similar at larger
values of k, i.e., k = 15 or higher, in terms of both edge count ratio and overlap.
6 Related Work
Various anonymization techniques have been proposed in the literature based on location
cloaking, i.e., reporting a larger area rather than a user’s exact location, in order to provide
k-anonymity for location-based service users. Approaches such as New Casper [11], Priv´ e
[7], and PrivacyGrid [2] cloak each query’s location to include at least k other users. There-
fore, an attacker’s certainty about a speciﬁc user’s issuance of a query is at most 1=k. Other
approaches such as CliqueCloak [5] collect and submit k queries with the same cloaked loca-
tion at the same time to an LBS. The problem in LBS anonymization techniques is slightly
different than the problem discussed in this paper as it deals with anonymizing queries
one at a time. In contrast, anonymizing a dataset with location information involves more
rigorous optimization as it needs to anonymize all the records at the same time. Moreover,
our anonymization technique deals with a more complex location model, i.e., top m loca-
tions, rather than a single location for each user. Another obvious contrast is consideration
of network connections in our approach. It is worth to mention that there exist other ap-
proaches to privacy for location-based services in the literature that avoid anonymization
and use cryptography-based private information retrieval techniques instead [6].
Re-identiﬁcation attacks on social network datasets and anonymization techniques to pre-
vent them have been considered as very important emerging research problems recently.
Backstrom et al. present a family of active/passive attacks that work based on uniqueness
of some small random subgraphs embedded in a network [1]. Hay et al. show signiﬁcantly
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low k-anonymity in real, naively anonymized social networks when considering structural
queries such as degree of a target node as adversarial background knowledge [9, 8]. The
social network anonymization approaches that have been proposed in the literature can be
categorized into two groups: graph generalization and graph perturbation. In generaliza-
tion techniques [8, 17, 3], the network is ﬁrst partitioned into subgraphs. Then each subgraph
is replaced by a supernode, and only some structural properties of the subgraph alongside
linkage between clusters are reported. In perturbation techniques , the network is modiﬁed to
meet desired privacy requirements. This is usually carried out by adding and/or removing
graph edges. The perturbation methods include randomly adding/removing edges [9, 15],
and providing k-anonymity in terms of node degrees [10, 14] and node neighborhood [18].
Naturally, the focus of social network anonymization approaches is on anonymizing struc-
tural patterns such as node degree and neighborhood, and not on information associated
with the nodes. However, some approaches such as [18] also consider anonymizing node
labels based on generalization trees. Nevertheless, none of these methods deal with loca-
tion data associated with nodes as needed for anonymization of GSN datasets.
7 Conclusions
Geosocial networks are growing fast and becoming popular social networking tools, which
naturally brings up the privacy issues with regards to the huge amount of the location-rich
data collected by these systems. Proper anonymization mechanisms are necessary to be
developed speciﬁcally for GSN datasets since the location information is more complex
and harder to anonymize and preserve at the same time, compared to other simpler data
attributes.
In this work, we suggested that both users’ and their friends’ location information can
be misused by an attacker for re-identiﬁcation purpose. We formalized and proposed two
notions of anonymity with regards to location information in GSN datasets, namely, Lk-
anonymity and L2
k-anonymity. We formalized a family of top location models, the top
regions model and the top venues model, geared to different types of GSN datasets. Also,
we proposed algorithms for anonymizing a GSN dataset based on these notions, and ana-
lyzed their performance in the context of anonymization and preservation of information,
using two different datasets.
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